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Our social encounters are dizzyingly complex. They not only 
involve overlapping layers of affective, conative, and cogni-
tive engagements between self and others. They are also 
deeply embedded in continually-changing environments that 
shape experiential, emotional, and epistemic forms of shar-
ing distinctive of these encounters—forms of sharing that 
are, in turn, further modulated by contextual factors such 
as real or imagined group membership and shifting social 
identities. Moreover, each of these social processes variously 
affects and feeds back onto the others. This complex tangle 
of multi-layered processes supports core social capacities 
like our capacity for interaction, cooperation, affective shar-
ing, joint agency, and social identification. It also directly 
impacts our capacity for empathy: our ability to perceive, 
understand, and respond to the experiences and behavior of 
others. Empathy is facilitated—but also modulated, biased, 
or even disrupted by—various aspects of these processes. In 
other words, empathy is a robustly situated practice, one that 
is bound up with a rich array of processes that encompass 
not only the dynamics of our face-to-face engagements but 
also the complex environments in which these engagements 
develop and take shape.
To be sure, it is not controversial so say that these fun-
damental dimensions of our sociality, which can be broadly 
subsumed under the labels “empathy”, “shared emotions”, 
and “social identity”, are variously and massively intercon-
nected. Most contemporary philosophers, cognitive scien-
tists, developmental and social psychologists, and social 
neuroscientists working in these areas will readily subscribe 
at least to the general contours of this picture. It is all the 
more surprising, therefore, that little attention has so far been 
paid to conceptually and systematically clarifying how these 
different social processes might intersect and impact one 
another. Instead, most of the relevant philosophical, social-
scientific, and empirical work in the past decade has focused 
primarily on specific aspects of these different dimensions of 
sociality in isolation, and has not systematically addressed 
their interconnection.
This special issue shifts the focus of these debates by 
exploring links between philosophical and psychological 
research on empathy, shared emotions, and social identity. 
The individual contributions to this special issue are diverse 
and cover a range of topics and issues. They cluster around 
the following sets of questions:
 i. What psychological mechanisms underpin instrumen-
tal helping and prosocial behaviour?
 ii. To what extent does empathy enable joint agency, 
emotional sharing, and the emergence and main-
tenance of group and social identity? What role do 
pre-reflective or subpersonal process play here? What 
about narrative practices?
 iii. Conversely, how do shared emotions, social identity, 
or group membership modulate or bias empathic 
understanding at both the interpersonal and the inter-
group level?
 iv. What is the nature of social identification, and how 
does our ability to empathize with a particular other 
impact our identification with a group?
 v. Do complex forms of social identification (e.g., group-
identification) presuppose more basic forms of empa-
thy or other interpersonal processes like joint atten-
tion and imitation? What exclusionary and ingroup/
outgroup mechanisms are involved?
 vi. What role do the interrelated socio-psychological pro-
cesses of stereotyping, social (self-)categorization, 
depersonalization, or dehumanization play here, and 
how does self-alienation factor in?
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Before we outline how the nine contributions to this issue 
address these questions, we will first provide context by 
sketching the most relevant recent debates at the intersection 
between social cognition, social ontology, and social psy-
chology. Along the way, we shall point to some unresolved 
issues, desiderata, and avenues for future research.
1  Research Background and Future Avenues
Consider first recent work on social cognition in philosophy 
and the cognitive sciences, where we can witness a partial 
shift of focus away from the more established theory of mind 
debate to explorations of the relation between empathy and 
affective sharing. One of the central questions in this area 
of research is whether empathy amounts to some form of 
affective sharing—that is, whether the sharing of affective 
states between the subject and the target of empathy is a 
necessary requirement for (successful) empathic under-
standing (cf. Michael 2014). According to one trend in cur-
rent social cognition research, which is gaining increased 
traction, empathy is conceived in primarily affective terms, 
rather than as a predominantly cognitive form perspective-
taking or mindreading.1 Here, empathy is characterized as 
the “simulation of the feelings of others” or as “caused by 
sharing the emotions of another person” (Hein and Singer 
2008; cf. de Vignemont and Singer 2006). Relatedly, it has 
been argued that empathy is itself an affective state, which 
necessarily requires “interpersonal similarity”: some rel-
evant similarity between the affective state of the subject 
and the target of empathy (Jacob 2011; De Vignemont and 
Jacob 2012). Moreover, according to this view, empathy also 
entails a “care” for the affective state of the other, which 
brings it closer to what is usually called sympathy (ibid.) 
(although none of these authors hold that empathy thereby 
can be equated with sympathy).
Meanwhile, authors mainly drawing on the phenomeno-
logical tradition, and especially on the work of Edmund 
Husserl, Edith Stein, Max Scheler or Alfred Schütz, have 
forcefully challenged this assumption. They claim that 
empathy—viewed in this tradition roughly as a sui generis 
ability to perceptually access and understand the experien-
tial life of others (Zahavi 2014; Jardine and Szanto 2017; 
Krueger 2018; cf. also Michael and Fardo 2014)—is nei-
ther itself an affective state nor requires any isomorphism 
between subjects’ and the targets’ mental or affective states. 
Empathy does not amount to any form of affective shar-
ing of the relevant states, either. As phenomenologists such 
as Scheler (1913/1926) or Stein (1917, 1922) have long 
emphasized, it must be markedly distinguished not only from 
emotional contagion and forms of ‘feeling-with’ (as in ‘I 
feel with your loss’), or sympathy, but also from any form of 
‘feeling-together’2 or forms of emotional sharing that today 
are discussed in terms collective emotions.3
Debates about collective emotions concern whether 
and in what sense a collection of individuals can properly 
speaking share an emotional episode. Consider, for example, 
members of a football team who are collectively (i.e., jointly, 
as a team) grieving over their deceased teammate, or who 
are proud of their success in the tournament (‘We are very 
happy with the result’).
But apart from the phenomenological accounts mentioned 
previously, there is very little conceptual precision when 
it comes to determining the relation between empathy and 
both interpersonal and collective forms of emotional shar-
ing. Incidentally, this relation has hardly been empirically 
studied either, and is yet very little understood. However 
one may decide upon this issue—and the editors, as well 
as most contributors to this issue, tend to side with the phe-
nomenological line of thought—for the present context it is 
crucial to note the following. Even if one holds that empathy 
and emotional sharing are in fact clearly distinct social pro-
cesses—and that, moreover, the former doesn’t necessarily 
involve the latter—one can still consistently hold that they 
are interlinked by various social-psychological dynamics.
In this connection, it’s worth mentioning a bold phenom-
enologically inspired proposal by Salice and Taipale (2015) 
that aims to bridge social cognition and social ontology by 
developing an original account of group-directed empathy. 
The authors suggest that it is possible to have an empathic 
act when the target is not an individual or even individual 
members of a group, but rather the group itself. This possi-
bility, together with the phenomenological insight that empa-
thy is only possible if the empathic target has a (directly) 
perceptible body, leads them to the conclusion that groups as 
such are embodied agents; they may properly be attributed a 
body of their own, i.e., one that is not reducible to the bodies 
of their individual members. What is more, in discussing the 
differences between individual- and group-directed empathy, 
1 E.g., Gallese (2001), Decety and Lamm (2006), Decety and Meyer 
(2008), Eisenberg and Eggum (2009), cf. de Vignemont (2009).
2 See Zahavi (2014, 2015a, 2018), León and Zahavi (2016), Szanto 
(2015), Szanto and Moran (2015, 2016); cf. also Vendrell Ferran 
(2015), Svenaeus (2016, 2018).
3 Research on shared or collective emotions is still very recent, but 
constitutes an already burgeoning interdisciplinary field, includ-
ing sociologists, social and developmental psychologists (cf., for an 
overview, von Scheve and Salmela 2014) and numerous philosophers 
(e.g., Gilbert 2002, 2014; Tollefsen 2006; Konzelmann Ziv 2007, 
2009; Helm 2008, 2017; Schmid 2009, 2014; Huebner 2011; Michael 
2011; Salmela 2012, 2014; Salmela and Nagatsu 2016a, 2016b; 
Krueger 2014, 2015; Szanto 2015, 2018; León et  al. (forthcoming); 
Thonhauser forthcoming; for recent review articles, see Schmid 
(2018) and Salmela (forthcoming).
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and in particular different display and vehicles of the expres-
sion of (shared) emotions, they argue that for structural and 
essential reasons our empathic grasp of the affective states 
of groups is more informative, “more extensive, exhaus-
tive”, and indeed “more adequate”, than in the case of indi-
viduals (ibid., p. 166). Similarly, one of us (Szanto 2015) 
has claimed that individual-member-to-group and group-
to-individual-member directed empathy might correct for 
various cases of misidentification regarding shared emotions 
(even if they are, pace Salice and Taipale, not more reli-
able or adequate than ordinary interpersonal forms). Such 
misidentifications include, among others, misidentification 
what the communities’ standards of emotional sharing are, 
or whether there are any properly shared emotions between 
a given member and the group in the first place.
A number of issues, however, remained unresolved with 
regard to such collective forms of empathy. For example, 
what is the relation between such collective empathic 
stances and feelings of group-belongingness, ingroup homo-
geneity, or favoritism? Presumably, if a group collectively 
engages in empathy towards outgroups, this will strengthen 
ingroup cohesion, for instance, by way of social distinction. 
Furthermore, if individual members empathize with the 
shared emotions of their ingroup, they may gain additional 
affective reasons to retain their membership. For example, a 
member of a political movement may thus learn that certain 
values or affective concerns are shared by other members, a 
fact that she might not have realized simply by focusing on 
some doctrinal propositions of the movement; and this will 
typically reinforce her attachment. Identifying the norms 
guiding emotional sharing via group-directed empathy may 
also facilitate affective conformity, and help maintain the 
shared emotional patterns of the given group. Finally, group-
directed empathy may reinforce a sense of belonging, if, for 
instance, individuals become aware that they are not empa-
thized with as individuals, but become targets of empathic 
stances of other groups or third parties, as members of a 
certain group. This seems especially salient in settings of 
intergroup antagonism, such as racism, when social cogni-
tion towards (and indeed recognition of) one’s own ingroup 
is biased or disrupted (cf. Ito and Bartholow 2009; Xu et al. 
2009; Losin et al. 2012). Even though there has been some 
related empirical research on the modulatory effects of 
sociocultural identity and ingroup/outgroup distinctions on 
interpersonal empathic encounters (see more below), such 
effects on group-directed or intergroup empathic relations 
have so far been underexamined.
Another relevant context where the connection between 
mindreading, simulation, and empathy, on one hand, and 
forms of collaboration, on the other, has been systemati-
cally investigated is the enactivist and so-called “interac-
tionist” paradigm in social cognition research. Different 
proposals have investigated in what sense social cognition 
can be viewed as a specific form of (embodied) interaction. 
From this enactive perspective, the claim is not simply that 
face-to-face interaction is a contextual factor or an enabling 
condition for social cognition but rather that is it a constitu-
tive feature of it.4 Furthermore, there is a related and rap-
idly increasing body of work exploring, more specifically, 
links not just between social cognition and interaction but 
also between social cognition and joint attention and joint 
agency.5 For instance, it has not only been argued that col-
laborating agents are better mindreaders, since they can draw 
on a situational cues afforded by the very interaction, which 
might be otherwise unavailable (Butterfill 2013)6; moreo-
ver, classical and contemporary phenomenologists have sug-
gested that more complex forms of experiential we-inten-
tionality and group agency must in fact be founded upon 
more basic, embodied forms of interaction and, in particular, 
face-to-face empathic encounters (Zahavi 2014, 2015a, b; 
León and Zahavi 2016; cf. also Szanto 2015, 2018).
Two further topics regarding the relation between inter-
personal empathic stances and the broader social and moral 
context in which they are embedded should be flagged here. 
The first concerns the role of social typification, an issue 
that has not been sufficiently recognized in contemporary 
discussions in social cognition, but that has been explored in 
great detail in the work of early phenomenological thinkers 
such as Schütz and Gurwitsch. As they argue, in all inter-
personal empathic encounters there is always a more or less 
explicit and more or less specific typification of the other(s) 
at play. Others are grasped and recognized as concrete per-
sonal individuals in direct face-to-face encounters and, at 
the same time, as more or less “anonymous” representatives 
or proxies of ideal social types (e.g., Schutz 1932; Schutz 
and Luckmann 1973; cf. Zahavi 2014 and esp. Taipale 
2016). Moreover, concrete others are always and already 
given “as bearers of roles”, and in more or less specific and 
more or less familiar social “situations” (Gurwitsch 1931, 
p. 111). Again, others never simply appear in a social void. 
For instance, when greeting the postman who just handed 
you a letter, you directly perceive both the charming young 
man and the anonymous one whom you were eagerly await-
ing this morning, and maybe even the surprisingly cheerful 
4 Cf. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), De Jaegher et  al. (2010), 
Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), Gallagher (2008a, b), Gallagher and 
Varga (2014), Krueger (2011, 2012), Schilbach et  al. (2013), Satne 
and Roepstorff (2015), Chemero (2016), see, critically; Herschbach 
(2012), Michael et al. (2014), Overgaard and Michael (2015).
5 E.g., Pacherie and Dokic (2006), Hobson and Hobson (2007), Gal-
lotti and Frith (2013), Tomasello (2014), Abramova and Slors (2015), 
Bianchin (2015), León (2016), Martens and Schlicht (2018).
6 Incidentally, early phenomenologists such as Gurwitsch (1931) 
have already pursued very similar lines of interactionist argument 
regarding empathy, see Jardine and Szanto (2017), and more below.
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representative of the near-bankrupt state-service that is 
known for how poorly their employees are paid. Current 
approaches typically don’t pay enough attention to this inter-
play between social and situational typification, direct per-
ception and empathy.
The second issue concerns the relation between empathy 
and certain morally relevant stances towards the other, in 
particular, forms of recognition, social visibility, and respect. 
For example, it has been argued that early phenomenologi-
cal conceptions of empathy such as Stein’s and Husserl’s 
have the resources to clarify the moral and epistemologi-
cal foundations of recognition. Specifically, they can help 
to refine notions like the “elementary recognition” of the 
personhood of others, introduced by critical theorist such 
as Honneth (2001), and understood as a process that pre-
cedes objectifying judgment or explicit evaluative appraisal 
of specific characteristics of the other (Jardine 2015, 2017; 
cf. also Varga and Gallagher 2011). At the same time, as 
Jardine (2015, 2017) suggests, the nuanced direct perceptual 
account of empathy that we find for example in Stein’s work 
may help clarifying the related issue of “social (in)visibility” 
of others (Honneth 2001). For, such a phenomenological 
account could specify the interpersonal, affective, and prac-
tical contexts in which empathic recognition of others is 
always embedded, and also account for the empathic grasp 
of the more complex motivational and rational relations 
between another’s mental and affective states. Furthermore, 
as Drummond (2006) has elaborated, moral responses to 
others, and in particular, respect, are rooted in empathy, as 
only the latter provides the means to recognize the radical 
otherness of the other—a prerequisite for respect for another 
person as such. Such “recognition respect” (Darwall 2006) 
contrasts with sympathetic affective processes (notably sym-
pathy and compassion), which are rooted not in the other’s 
otherness, but rather in their sameness or similarity, and the 
possibility of persons to communalize an share emotional 
states or values. (On recognition and empathy, see also 
Fuchs’ and Zahavi’s contributions to this issue).
Finally, turning to empirical research, we find a vast 
body of evidence that emotional sharing and social identi-
fication not only motivates and modulates but indeed vari-
ously biases and disrupts empathic encounters. More spe-
cifically, neurophysiological data suggests that group and 
ethnic membership often biases the affective, cognitive, 
responsive or emotion-regulative components of empathy 
(for a review, see Eres and Molenberghs 2013). For exam-
ple, it has been shown that empathic and vicarious sensory 
responses (e.g., vicarious pain) are more likely to be elicited 
in ingroup than outgroup members (e.g., in ethnic, racial or 
political conflict settings).7 Similarly, it has been shown that 
the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms of empathy, 
such as neural activation in mental simulation, is reduced by 
outgroup prejudices, ingroup favoritism, and sociocultural 
or ethnic identity in general, but also in certain professional 
(e.g., medical) contexts (Cheng et al. 2007; Decety et al. 
2010). Furthermore, analyzing collective rituals (e.g., fire-
walking spectacles) it has been observed that there is a tight 
synchronization of cardiovascular arousal patterns between 
performers and family-members in the audience, which are 
similar to affective mirroring processes underlying empathy 
(Konvalinka et al. 2011). Social identity related modula-
tions have also been demonstrated regarding the accuracy 
of perception and prediction of group-level emotions from 
outgroups (Seger et al. 2009). Such biases have even been 
observed in early-infant imitation (Buttelmann et al. 2013; 
Over and Carpenter 2012, 2013) and learning (Kinzler et al. 
2011), suggesting that mental simulation or affective mir-
roring is reduced by outgroup prejudices already at an early 
phase of personal development (4–5 years of age) (cf. But-
telmann and Böhm 2014).
It is not quite clear whether and how these social per-
ception biases challenge or even undermine the baseline 
phenomenological picture of empathy, according to which 
empathy is—primarily, at least—based on direct perception 
of embodied minds or direct embodied interaction. It is not 
even clear whether further empirical research could possibly 
settle this issue, or whether we need more conceptual and 
phenomenologically grounded studies. Gallagher and Varga 
(2014), who have endorsed the latter strategy, convincingly 
argue that far from challenging the idea of direct embod-
ied perception, these findings rather undermine the deeply 
entrenched view from mainstream social cognition research, 
according to which there would be some hardwired theory 
of mind modules.
In a related field of social-psychological research, a num-
ber of features regarding group size, structure and ingroup/
outgroup dynamics have been studied, in order to investigate 
how they modulate prosocial responses and, in particular, 
on the attribution and perception of mental and affective 
properties, or the “humanness”, of others. Research on the 
familiar phenomenon of “collapse of compassion” has exam-
ined why groups in need are less prone to elicit empathic 
concern than individuals. Moreover, it has been shown that 
the increase of the number of suffering individuals, and in 
particular of outgroup members, decreases prosocial affec-
tive responses and behaviour (Cameron and Payne 2011). 
There has been also research on how and which types of 
group membership diminish the attribution of mental states 
7 See Xu et  al. (2009), Avenanti et  al. (2010), Chiao and Mathur 
(2010), Hein et al. (2010), Beeney et al. (2011), Cikara et al. (2011), Azevedo et  al. (2013), Bruneau et  al. (2012), Gutsell and Inzlicht 
(2012); cf. Gallagher and Varga (2014).
Footnote 7 (continued)
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and emotions to individuals. It has been demonstrated that 
there are higher thresholds for attributing and perceiving 
minds in outgroup than ingroup faces—they require for 
example more salient anthropomorphic characteristics or 
stronger emotional expressions (Hackel et al. 2014; cf. also 
Epley et al. 2007). These effects have been even confirmed 
in the so-called “minimal group” condition, where the para-
digm includes randomized group settings. Thus, even with-
out any relevant prior experiences of intergroup conflicts 
and the absence of relevant stereotypes, subjects are prone 
to such social perception biases (Hackel et al. 2014). Related 
studies have focused on the modulation in mind attribution 
and perception and the issue of “group entitativity” (Camp-
bell 1958; Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Lickel et al. 2000). 
The entitativity of a group refers to the degree according to 
which a collection of individuals is subjectively perceived 
precisely not as a random collection or aggregate but as a 
coherent social unit. It has been demonstrated that there 
is a strong negative correlation between the attribution of 
minds and the degree of group entitativity: subjects tend 
to attribute less autonomy and less “humanness” features, 
such as own mental states, intentions, etc., to individuals 
who are perceived as belonging to highly entitative groups 
(e.g., tight-knit, homogenous communities) (Morewedge 
et al. 2013). All these depersonalization and infra-humani-
zation effects are consistently heightened by strong ingroup 
identification of social cognizers. On the other hand, the 
effects are moderated by (perceived or real) specific threats 
from outgroup members, which then facilitates mind attribu-
tion and the accuracy of social perception. This latter effect 
seems particularly interesting in political, ethnic or other 
intergroup conflicts.
Again, neither mainstream work in social cognition 
research, which till very recently focused mostly on the 
theory of mind debate and developmental-psychological 
issues related to it, nor phenomenological, interactionist or 
direct perception accounts of empathy have so far seriously 
engaged with these empirical studies.8 This oversight rep-
resents a significant lacuna, all the more so as a systematic 
investigation of these and related9 social perception biases 
might offer new avenues to also conceptually investigate the 
still little understood relationship between empathy, shared-
ness and group membership.
2  The Papers of the Issue
The papers in this special issue can be divided into three 
main groups: (1) The first consists of two papers discussing 
the relationship between empathy, cooperation and prosocial 
behaviour. (2) The three papers of the second group tackle 
interpersonal and collective forms of sharing, while (3) the 
four last papers address the complex, often biased or deviant 
relationship, between empathy, social and group identifica-
tion, and the constitution of a ‘we’. Let us now give brief 
synopses of each of these contributions.
Anika Fiebich’s “Social Cognition, Empathy and Agent-
Specificities in Cooperation” begins this special issue by 
offering a rich three-dimensional characterization of coop-
eration. Fiebich argues that cooperative behavior lies on con-
tinuum of cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions, 
all of which must be accounted for if we are to understand 
how it is that we successfully do things together. Accord-
ing to Fiebich, current debates about cooperation and joint 
actions—i.e., actions where two or more social agents share 
an intention to work together toward a common goal, such as 
moving a piece of furniture or playing music—are generally 
framed in folk psychological term. In other words, dominant 
accounts (e.g., Bratman, Searle) portray joints actions as 
requiring sophisticated theory of mind capacities that enable 
individuals to accurately represent the desires and intentions 
of others in order to integrate these with the individual’s own 
desires and intentions. Drawing on both developmental and 
phenomenological research, Fiebich challenges this cogni-
tivist picture. She summons different streams of empirical 
evidence to argue that children engage in many forms of 
affectively-guided cooperative activities long before they 
acquire the metacognitive capacities needed for a theory of 
mind. And she concludes with a call for a plural approach to 
cooperation, one which acknowledges the ways that shared 
affective states and agent-specificities can both supplement 
and, at times, replace, metacognitive capacities in the realm 
of cooperative behavior.
John Michael and Marcell Székely’s “Goal Slippage: 
A Mechanism for Spontaneous Instrumental Helping in 
Infancy” continues this developmental focus. They note 
that developmental psychology has, in recent years, shown 
increased interest in various forms of prosocial behavior in 
infants and young children: e.g., comforting, sharing, point-
ing to provide information, and spontaneous instrumen-
tal helping (e.g., helping to retrieve a puzzle piece that’s 
fallen on the floor, or putting a stack of books back into a 
cabinet). This ability to spontaneously and flexibly adapt 
8 For the only exceptions we are aware of, see again Gallagher and 
Varga (2014), Varga (2017), and Fuchs’s contribution to this issue.
9 One such related family of social cognition biases comprises recent 
discussions of so-called ‘implicit’ (mostly racial or gender-related) 
biases. While psychologists and cognitive scientists have extensively 
investigated the underlying processes of implicit social cognition (cf. 
for reviews, see Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Frith and Frith 2008; 
Nosek et  al. 2011), and philosophers have begun to systematically 
tackle the epistemology, metaphysics and ethics of implicit biases 
(Brownstein and Saul 2016a, b; for review articles see: Kelly and 
Roedder 2008; Brownstein 2015; Holroyd et  al. 2017), philosophi-
cal, and in particular phenomenological, research on the relation-
ship between social perception, embodiment and empathy on the one 
hand, and implicit biases on the other is missing.
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to the intentions and behavior of others, and to integrate 
our own behavioral responses with theirs, is at the root of 
our cooperative capacities. Michael and Székely critically 
evaluate several models that attempt to explain the psycho-
logical mechanisms underpinning this ability, highlighting 
strengths and weaknesses of each. They then propose their 
own model—the “goal slippage” model of spontaneous 
instrumental helping—based on the core idea that the iden-
tification of an agent’s goal leads infants to take up that goal 
as though it were their own, since infants lack the internal 
resources to quarantine others’ goals from their own endog-
enously generated goals. Michael and Székely develop their 
view by clarifying the psychological content of others’ goals 
the infant takes up as though they were her own by develop-
ing a “lean” notion of content. They then argue that their 
goal slippage model is better suited for explaining cogni-
tively undemanding forms of prosocial behavior than other 
competing models, and they show how it might provide a 
useful starting point for further research into the ontogeny 
of the psychological underpinnings of human cooperation.
Anna Ciaunica’s “The ‘Meeting of Bodies’: Empathy 
and Basic Forms of Shared Experiences” shifts the focus 
from shared behavior to shared experiences. Ciaunica begins 
with a seemingly obvious observation that has nevertheless 
been overlooked in ongoing discussions of empathy and 
embodiment: we begin our social life within the lived body 
of another, i.e., our mother. She argues that this observa-
tion has explanatory significance for debates about both the 
development and character of our empathic capacities. This 
is because most current discussions of empathy, including 
those drawing upon phenomenologists like Husserl, Sartre, 
Stein, Scheler, and Schutz, focus primarily on face-to-face 
encounters in which we see others’ mental states embodied 
in their expressive and goal-directed behavior. According 
to these vision-centric approaches, we share others’ expe-
riences insofar as they become perceptual content for our 
own experience. Ciaunica does not dispute the importance 
of these phenomenologically motivated accounts. However, 
she argues that before we visually relate to other subjects 
as objects, we are already bodily connected with them—
as becomes clear when we look at the various ways that 
we are bodily and experientially bound up with caregivers 
during pregnancy and early infancy. Citing developmental 
evidence, Ciaunica argues that these “skin-to-skin” encoun-
ters do not disappear following infancy, but rather remain 
integral to our empathic encounters with others throughout 
our life. Accordingly, our models of empathy and experien-
tial sharing should begin with a consideration of how these 
proximal body-based ways of establishing mutual awareness 
underwrite the visuo-spatial forms of empathy that are often 
thought to be developmentally primitive.
Alessandro Salice, Simon Høffding, and Shaun Gal-
lagher’s “Putting Plural Self-Awareness into Practice: The 
Phenomenology of Expert Musicianship” is, like Ciauni-
ca’s contribution, a focused investigation of the character 
of shared experience. However, whereas Ciaunica focuses 
on shared experience during pregnancy and early infancy, 
these authors have a different target: the phenomenology of 
shared agency when performing music together. They take 
a careful look at qualitative data drawn from interviews with 
highly-skilled musicians, The Danish String Quartet; these 
interviews lend insight into what it’s like to perform music 
with others at a world-class level of expertise. Based on 
these interviews, Salice, Høffding, and Gallagher argue that, 
within this performing experience, the musicians develop a 
sense of “we-agency”: the experience of performing a sin-
gle action toward which the individual members enjoy an 
epistemically privileged access. This “we-agency” involves 
more than mere motor resonance between the performers or 
explicit coordination arising from members paying atten-
tion to what the others are doing. There is, additionally, an 
affective, interkinesthetic awareness that one’s individual 
sense of agency has been drawn up into a group agency—a 
“we-agency”—in which one’s perception–action loops are 
responsive to, and modulate by, those of the other members. 
The authors conclude their rich phenomenological analysis 
by discussing the significance of this view for thinking about 
the place of self-knowledge and observational knowledge in 
collective action.
Shaun Gallagher and Deborah Tollefsen’s “Advancing the 
‘We’ Through Narrative” puts narrativity to center stage in 
the collective intentionality debate. To be sure, it is fairly 
uncontroversial that narratives play an important role not 
only in the framing and maintaining, or indeed the establish-
ment of personal identity, but also for collective “we-iden-
tities”. Yet, the concept of narrativity has so far been rather 
sidelined in social ontology. This is all the more surprising 
given the veritable research industry on the cognate notion 
of collective memory, and if we consider that narrativity 
has also been increasingly discussed in the philosophy of 
personal identity and the philosophy of emotions in the past 
decades. In the face of this, Gallagher and Tollefsen propose 
a new account of so-called “we-narratives”. Following the 
authors, we-narratives can roughly be characterized as joint 
communicative reflections or stories about a group’s past, 
present or future actions, intentions, goals or norms. They 
are typically, though not necessarily, told or expressed in 
some discursive form from the first-person plural perspec-
tive (‘what we were doing’, ‘what we ought to do next’, etc.) 
(cf. also Tollefsen and Gallagher 2017). The authors con-
sider a number of different, more or less ephemeral forms 
of joint agency and collective experiences (ad hoc, planned, 
and longer-term, coordinated joint actions), and show how 
we-narratives not only reflect the structure of the respective 
dyads or groups and build the typical representation format 
for a retrospective attribution of shared intentionality and 
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agency; they also argue that we-narratives indeed underpin 
prospective joint intention formation and practical delibera-
tion. Moreover, Gallagher and Tollefsen demonstrate how 
we-narratives play key roles in the formation of a robust 
group identity and thus contribute to groups’ stability over 
time, beyond discrete collective actions and experiences and 
across changing individual membership.
Joona Taipale’s “The Structure of Group Identifica-
tion” presents a comprehensive and original account of 
group identification. For several decades now, the notion 
of group identification has been ubiquitous in developmen-
tal and social psychology. It has been extensively discussed 
to elaborate the nature of the affective, psychological and 
social-ontological relationship between individuals and 
groups. Curiously, however, a precise conceptual and phe-
nomenological determination of the intentional and experi-
ential structure of the identification at stake is still outstand-
ing. Moreover, the notion is beset by a roaster of conceptual 
ambiguities, in particular when it comes to the nature of the 
target and the intentional act of identification. Taipale aims 
at disambiguating this notion, in order to demarcate it from 
cognate but different phenomena such as empathy, sympa-
thy, and other relations of identity and similarity. Thus, the 
paper aims to advance our phenomenological understanding 
of the very act of identification. Taipale investigates a num-
ber or complex and important questions like: are there any 
relevant experiential, intentional, and structural differences 
between identifying with particular individuals, others qua 
group-members, and group as such? What is the nature of 
the experiential relation that identification with somebody 
entails for the subject and the target of identification, and 
what roles (if any) do identity and similarity play here? And 
is group identification a diachronically enfolding process of 
establishing a group membership, or is it the realization of 
an identity or similarity that has already been established? In 
tackling these fundamental issues, Taipale proposes a fine-
grained, multi-dimensional model of group identification, 
one which can account for different types of establishing 
and robustly maintaining the social identity of the subjects 
of identification, depending on the type and nature of their 
targets.10
Casey Rebecca Johnson’s “Intellectual Humility and 
Empathy by Analogy” addresses the question of how imagi-
native perspective-taking is possible in cases of interper-
sonal encounters in which the other person is fundamentally 
different from or deeply disagreeing with oneself? After 
all, empathic understanding is crucial precisely when our 
empathetic target’s intellectual outlook and/or experiential 
background starkly differ from our own. But some have 
recently denied that true interpersonal understanding is pos-
sible in such cases. In contrast, Johnson argues that defend-
ers of a specific analogical conception of empathy need not 
recoil in the face of this challenge. Johnson addresses the 
challenge by bringing the relevant analogical account of 
empathy into relief against competing accounts, and in par-
ticular by drawing on the notion of intellectual humility, dis-
cussed in recent philosophical and psychological work. Once 
we recognize our own epistemic, cognitive and experiential 
limitations and realize that they are analogous to our empa-
thetic targets, that is, once we exercise intellectual humility, 
Johnson argues, the way for empathy is paved, even if the 
barriers of understanding seem initially insurmountable.
Thomas Fuchs’ paper “Empathy, Group Identity, and the 
Mechanisms of Exclusion: An Investigation into the Lim-
its of Empathy” brings together the issue of group iden-
tification with the bounds of interpersonal understanding 
in the face of potentially insurmountable sociocultural or 
ethnic barriers. Like Johnson, Fuchs, too, fathoms the limits 
of empathy, but this time by drawing on historical exam-
ples of mass atrocities and genocides, and by discussing 
the phenomenon of a dissociation of empathy. What is the 
link between the empirically well-documented tendency to 
exhibit preferential biases in empathizing with one’s ingroup 
(see above, Sect. 1) to the notorious Nazi perpetrator who, 
in empathic dissociation, behaves as a fully empathic fam-
ily member while committing horrific mass executions in 
concentration camps? Fortunately, there seems to be no 
direct or short route leading from the former to the latter. 
However, as Fuchs demonstrates, the two phenomena lie 
on the same spectrum of empathic bias. In exploring this 
tendency, Fuchs discusses different forms of empathy and 
the mutual interconnection between higher-level forms of 
empathy and recognition. He argues that the mere capacity 
of empathy is not sufficient to instantiate empathic stances 
towards all members of the human species. We need, addi-
tionally, a basic form of recognition of others as persons 
to whose claim we have to respond. Such recognition can 
then serve as a means of “extending” empathy, regardless of 
whether the empathic targets belong to one’s ingroup or not. 
By investigating exclusionary and discriminatory mecha-
nisms, and in particular dehumanization, and their impact on 
neutralizing empathic recognition, Fuchs ultimately argues 
that extreme dissociations of empathy have also detrimental 
top-down impact on primary empathy and the very person-
hood of the perpetrators, who eventually become themselves 
dehumanized.
Dan Zahavi’s contribution “Empathy, Self-Alienation, 
and Group Membership” integrates a number of threads of 
the preceding articles. Zahavi engages in a phenomenologi-
cal discussion of the ways in which second-personal encoun-
ters and empathic stances affect our self-understanding, and 
10 For a recent discussion of the relation between group identification 
and collective intentionality, pertinent to the present special issue, see 
Salice and Miyazono (forthcoming).
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how their interconnection plays out in the constitution of 
plural, or ‘we’-identities. Zahavi first sketches the concep-
tual terrain by critically comparing Heidegger’s skeptical 
and deflationary views on empathy’s role for the constitution 
and understanding of plural identities with other classical 
phenomenologists, who hold that dyadic-empathic engage-
ments are indeed constitutive of the ‘we’. Drawing chiefly 
on Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity and his theory of 
collective intentionality avant la lettre, but also critically 
discussing a number of contemporary accounts from phi-
losophy, social and developmental psychology, Zahavi then 
explores the phenomenological, psychological and intersub-
jective mechanisms of this constitution, such as reciprocity, 
recognition, and self-alienation. He argues that they play a 
fundamental role for the establishment of a first-person plu-
ral perspective. Thus, by showing how shared and collective 
identities, or the ‘we’, require specific forms of self/other-
relations, involving specific forms of self-experience and 
self-alienation, Zahavi demonstrates how the first-person (I) 
and the second-person singular (I/Thou) and the first-person 
plural perspective (We) are essentially interlinked.
It is our hope that the articles in this special issue will 
spur further conversations about the underexamined links 
between empathy, shared emotions, and social identity.
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